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Crossing the Thin Blue Line: 
Protecting Law Enforcement Officers 
Who Blow the Whistle 
Ann C. Hodges and Justin Pugh* 
Law enforcement makes headline news for shootings of unarmed 
civilians, departmental corruption, and abuse of suspects and witnesses. 
Also well-documented is the code of silence, the thin blue line, which 
discourages officers from reporting improper and unlawful conduct by 
fellow officers. Accordingly, accountability is challenging and mistrust of 
law enforcement abounds. There is much work to be done in changing the 
culture of police departments and many recommendations for change. One 
barrier to transparency that has been largely ignored could be eliminated 
by reversal of the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos. 
Criticism of the decision has been widespread, but its specific consequences 
for law enforcement officers who cross the thin blue line remain little 
examined in the legal literature. This article begins to fill that gap. 
Garcetti held that when public employees speak pursuant to their job 
duties, their speech is unprotected by the First Amendment. This boundary 
creates a threshold hurdle that employees must meet before they can seek 
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protection from retaliation for speech. Garcetti has serious consequences 
in the hierarchical environment of law enforcement, removing 
Constitutional protection from retaliation for officers who report unlawful 
conduct through their chain of command. Reporting through the chain of 
command is often required by policy, practice and culture. While the 
Garcetti Court suggested that whistleblower laws fill the protection gap 
created by the elimination of First Amendment protection for employee 
speech, this article demonstrates that such laws do not provide adequate 
protection to officers who report, or want to report, corruption and abuse 
in their department. To reduce the disincentive to report illegal conduct of 
fellow officers, the Supreme Court should return to the Pickering 
balancing test. The Pickering test served well for forty years as a means to 
both protect public employee speech and give due weight to the 
government employer’s need to direct and control its workforce. 
Furthermore, the Pickering test eliminates confusion in the lower courts 
in deciding when an employee is speaking pursuant to job duties and 
better protects the public interest in government transparency. Protecting 
internal whistleblowers is essential to prevent and correct government 
corruption in law enforcement and elsewhere. While reversing Garcetti 
will not solve all the problems created by the culture of silence in law 
enforcement, it will eliminate one barrier to reporting misconduct by 
reinstating constitutional protection for such reports. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2014 Laquan McDonald, an African-American teen, was shot and 
killed by a police officer in Chicago.1 One year later a video was 
released that contradicted the story of the police officers at the scene.2 
The police officer who fired the shots was indicted for murder.3 After 
an investigation by a special prosecutor, three other police officers 
were charged with conspiracy, official misconduct, and obstruction of 
justice based on their reports of the incident.4 The special prosecutor 
stated: “The indictment makes clear that these defendants did more 
than merely obey an unofficial ‘code of silence.’ Rather it alleges that 
they lied about what occurred to prevent independent criminal 
investigators from learning the truth.”5 
Laquan McDonald, of course, is not the only African-American 
killed by police in recent years. More recently, police in Sacramento 
shot and killed Stephon Clark in his grandparents’ back yard.6 But the 
presence of video has enabled the public to learn much more about 
these incidents, documenting a problem that the African-American 
community has lamented for years. Why has it taken video? Many of 
these shootings have occurred in the presence of other officers. What 
prevents other officers from accurately reporting on what has 
occurred? One factor might be the well-documented code of silence 
among police officers alluded to by the prosecutor in the McDonald 
case.7 
 
 1 Nausheen Husain, Data: Laquan McDonald Timeline: The Shooting, the Video and 
the Fallout, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 20, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ 
laquanmcdonald/ct-graphics-laquan-mcdonald-officers-fired-timeline-htmlstory.html. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. In addition, the shooting prompted a federal investigation and the removal 
of the superintendent of police. Id. 
 5 Merrit Kennedy, 3 Chicago Police Officers Accused of Cover-Up in Killing of 
Laquan McDonald, NPR (June 27, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/06/27/534596557/3-chicago-police-officers-accused-of-cover-up-in-killing-
of-laquan-mcdonald.  
 6 Anita Chabria et al., Updated: ‘Show Me Your Hands.’ Police Video Shows Death of 
Stephon Clark in a Hail of Gunfire, SAC. BEE (March 21, 2018), http://www.sacbee.com/ 
latest-news/article206212019.html. 
 7 The problem of the police officer who wants to do the right thing when faced with 
corruption and violence by other officers has been the subject of popular books and 
films. See 15 Great Movies About Police Corruption that Are Worth Watching, TASTE OF 
CINEMA, http://www.tasteofcinema.com/2015/15-great-movies-about-police-corruption-
that-are-worth-watching/ (describing inter alia Prince in the City from 1981 and Serpico 
from 1973, both based on books) (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).  
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The police union in Chicago supported the officers who made false 
statements, although it is unclear what information the union had 
about the incident at the time.8 A significant part of the union’s role, 
however, is protecting officers from unjust discipline, and union-
negotiated protections may limit efforts to hold officers accountable 
for alleged misconduct.9 In fact, protections in the union contract may 
even encourage the code of silence.10 In light of these factors, 
unionized officers, accurately or not, may perceive pressure to support 
and not undermine accused fellow officers. 
Another factor is the prospect of reprisals following reports of 
official misconduct. Police officers who report malfeasance of other 
officers have limited constitutional protection. In 2006, the Supreme 
Court decided Garcetti v. Ceballos, and therein held that public 
employees who speak pursuant to their job duties have no First 
Amendment protection from retaliation for that speech.11 Lower 
courts have found that application of Garcetti “lead[s] to a vexing 
result in the context of police abuse.”12 While the Supreme Court 
suggested that whistleblower laws provided adequate substitute 
protection, whistleblower statutes do not in fact provide 
comprehensive protection for law enforcement officers reporting 
misconduct of other officers.13 Accordingly, this article argues that the 
Supreme Court should return to pre-Garcetti precedent. Doing so 
would protect government employees’ right to free speech under a 
fact-specific test that balances the employee’s speech rights against the 
employer’s interests in effective and efficient government.14 Having a 
 
 8 See Megan Crepeau, Prosecutors Can Use what Officer Van Dyke Told Union Rep at 
Laquan McDonald Shooting, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 11, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/local/breaking/ct-laquan-mcdonald-jason-van-dyke-court-met-20170811-story.html\. 
In similar cases, the union has also supported accused officers. See Catherine L. Fisk & L. 
Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 747-48 (2017). 
 9 Fisk & Richardson, supra note 8, at 736-44. As Fisk and Richardson document, 
however, unionization is a response to “managerial neglect and retaliation” as well as 
lack of voice and concerns about arbitrary discipline. Id. at 716, 723-26, 736-37. The 
authors show that unions can be part of the solution to the problem of police 
misconduct and have advanced police reform in some departments. Id. at 759-76. 
 10 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 14 (2017) https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download [hereinafter 
CHICAGO REPORT]. 
 11 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006). 
 12 Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1082 (9th Cir. 2013) (Pregerson, J., 
specially concurring). 
 13 See infra notes 152-183 and accompanying text. 
 14 See Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1968) (establishing the balancing test now known as Pickering balancing). 
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balancing test for free speech offers greater protection for employees 
reporting police misconduct, thus reducing the discouraging effect of 
the law. In addition, it furthers the public’s interest in holding law 
enforcement officers and other government employees accountable for 
misconduct. While a return to Pickering balancing is certainly not a 
complete solution to the problem of police officers who fail to speak 
out about the malfeasance of other officers, it removes at least one 
barrier to such speech, opening the door to other approaches to 
address the problem. 
Part I of this paper examines the roots of the growing furor about 
the problem of police misconduct and the need for information to 
address the problem. Using examples and analysis, this article suggests 
that the most reliable means to get this sort of information is by way of 
internal reporting from within law enforcement itself. This article then 
examines the current disincentives for such reporting. Specifically, 
Parts II–V explore why this sort of disclosure is highly unlikely in the 
current landscape. Parts II and III summarize the evolution of the 
Supreme Court’s doctrinal framework governing protections for public 
employee speech under the First Amendment, leading to the Garcetti 
case and the problem it poses. Part IV looks at developments in case 
law after Garcetti, showing that the case reduced the likelihood that 
officers reporting misconduct would be protected from retaliation. 
Part V analyzes other protections for public employees to determine 
whether they provide an adequate substitute for First Amendment 
protection. This article concludes that it does not. Finally, Part VI 
suggests a return to the Pickering test as a remedy and a means to 
incentivize reporting on matters of great public importance. 
I. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE NEED FOR DISCLOSURE 
Laquan McDonald is but one of many unarmed African-American 
men shot by police. In August 2014, Michael Brown was shot and 
killed in the predominantly African-American suburb of Ferguson, 
Missouri. Accounts of the events leading up to the shooting differed, 
but the evidence tended to show that Brown was unarmed when he 
was shot by a white police officer.15 The shooting kicked off a series of 
protests in the town of Ferguson, some of which became violent.16 
 
 15 See Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is 
Not Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ 
ferguson-darren-wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html. 
 16 Hasani Gittens, Shooting of Michael Brown Sparks Riots in Ferguson, Missouri, 
NBC NEWS (Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brown-
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Over a period of several months during summer and fall, Ferguson 
was the focus of national attention, the frontline for critics of police 
brutality and racial inequality, and the birthplace of the “Black Lives 
Matter” movement.17 
Allegations of police brutality and bias toward minority groups are 
nothing new. The pervasive notion that law enforcement treats 
minorities differently to their detriment traces its roots back through 
the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles in 1991, resulting in riots 
after the acquittal of the officers,18 to the Civil Rights Movement in the 
1960s and beyond. But for many, the Michael Brown shooting 
precipitated a growing appreciation for the plight of minority groups 
in their interaction with law enforcement. Persons all across the racial 
and ethnic spectrum began to take notice and call for reform. Their 
outcry was bolstered by studies suggesting that persons of color were 
far more likely to be shot and killed by police officers than whites.19 
At the state and local level, empirical evidence abounds supporting 
the disparate treatment of racial minorities at the hands of the police. 
For example, from January 1995 to December 1997, the Maryland 
State Police conducted a voluntary review of traffic stops along the 
Interstate 95 corridor.20 The study revealed that “70 percent of drivers 
stopped and searched by the police were black, a figure drastically 
disproportionate to the estimated 17.5 percent of drivers — and 
speeders — who were black.”21 Traffic stop studies in New Jersey, 
Louisiana, and Florida presented similar results.22 Elsewhere, studies 
conducted by the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) following 
outcry over “stop and frisk” programs revealed that almost eighty-four 
 
shooting/shooting-michael-brown-sparks-riots-ferguson-missouri-n177481. 
 17 Eliott C. McLaughlin, What We Know About Michael Brown’s Shooting, CNN (Aug. 
15, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/11/us/missouri-ferguson-michael-brown-what-
we-know/index.html. 
 18 Anjuli Sasky & Karen Grigsby Bates, When LA Erupted in Anger: A Look Back at 
The Rodney King Riots, NPR (April 25, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/04/26/ 
524744989/when-la-erupted-in-anger-a-look-back-at-the-rodney-king-riots. 
 19 See, e.g., US Police Shootings: How Many Die Each Year?, BBC MAGAZINE (July 18, 
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36826297 (citing a Washington Post 
study of news reports that found blacks 2.5 times more likely to be shot by police than 
whites); POLICE VIOLENCE REPORTS, http://mappingpoliceviolence.org (noting that 
statistics from 2015 and 2016 suggest blacks are three times more likely to be killed 
by police than whites) (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 20 Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Justice on Trial, Chapter One: Race and 
the Police, CIVILRIGHTS.ORG, https://web.archive.org/web/20090614190457/http:/www. 
civilrights.org/publications/justice-on-trial/race.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
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percent of the 175,000 “stops” effectuated by NYPD officers between 
January 1998 and March 1999 were of blacks and Hispanics.23 This 
was despite the fact that those groups constituted less than half of the 
city’s population.24 In the wake of the Michael Brown shooting, 
statistical analysis of police activity in Ferguson, Missouri revealed 
that blacks accounted for eighty-five percent of traffic stops, ninety 
percent of tickets, and ninety-three percent of arrests.25 This is despite 
the fact that Ferguson is about one-third white. 
The reality of widespread racial inequality in policing has been 
confirmed by data collected by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). 
This comes from DOJ reviews of urban police forces with reputations 
for cross-racial conflict. A 2016 DOJ audit of police practices in 
Baltimore revealed a pervasive pattern of unconstitutional stops, 
searches, arrests, and excessive force effectuated against minorities. 
This was coupled with retaliatory practices against those civilians and 
police officers that spoke out against misconduct.26 Similarly, a DOJ 
investigation into police practices in Chicago — often viewed as the 
frontline in the fight for racial equality in policing — disclosed a 
pattern and practice of excessive and unreasonable force against 
minorities.27 
This reality has resulted in a national call for oversight of law 
enforcement. In response, police forces at the state and federal level 
have taken various actions. These include new training programs, 
civilian review boards, and police body camera policies, to name a 
few.28 In spite of these practices, concern about lack of oversight for 
police officers remains. This concern is exacerbated by the perception 
that police officers are protected by a culture that discourages internal 
 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id.  
 25 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 4 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf (data taken 
from 2013 to 2015). 
 26 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (2016), http://civilrights.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/ 
20160810_DOJ%20BPD%20Report-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter BALTIMORE REPORT]. 
 27 CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 10, at 15. 
 28 Id. at 6-7; Jasmine Huda, St. Louis’ New Civilian Oversight Board Begins to Accept 
Complaints from Citizens, FOX2 NOW, (May 10, 2016) http://fox2now.com/2016/05/10/st-
louis-new-civilian-oversight-board-begins-to-accept-complaints-from-citizens/ (describing 
new oversight board created in St. Louis in the wake of events in Ferguson); see also St. 
Louis, Mo., Civilian Oversight Board, https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/ 
departments/public-safety/civilian-oversight-board/index.cfm (describing the Civilian 
Oversight Board and its responsibilities). 
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reporting and takes steps to insulate itself from legal recriminations. In 
colloquial parlance, this is the “Thin Blue Line.” That perception has 
been borne out by empirical data, public opinion, and popular culture. 
Some of the more shocking anecdotal evidence of the phenomenon 
comes from former New Jersey State Trooper Justin Hopson.29 As a 
rookie officer, Hopson witnessed an unlawful arrest and falsification of 
charges perpetrated by his training officer.30 When he refused to 
support the officer’s fabricated version of events, he became the target 
of a rogue group of troopers known as the Lords of Discipline 
(“LOD”).31 This organization had hazed and harassed New Jersey 
officers for years until Hopson’s defiance sparked a massive internal 
investigation by the state police.32 The culture of retaliation that 
Hopson’s experience suggests has been documented by numerous 
studies and surveys of police force reporting across the country.33 In 
particular, the Christopher Commission’s inquiry into Los Angeles 
police practices suggested that, “[p]erhaps the greatest single barrier 
to the effective investigation and adjudication of complaints is the 
officers’ unwritten ‘code of silence’ . . . . [the principle that] an officer 
does not provide adverse information against a fellow officer.”34 
Similar conclusions were reached in studies of police departments 
from New York to Louisiana.35 
 
 29 JUSTIN HOPSON, BREAKING THE BLUE WALL: ONE MAN’S WAR AGAINST POLICE 
CORRUPTION (2011).  
 30 Id. at 7-15. 
 31 Id. at 20-29. 
 32 Id. at 33-45, 74-78, 108, 128-33, 139; see also Thad Moore, Taking on the Blue 
Wall, THE POST AND COURIER (May 26, 2012), https://www.postandcourier.com/ 
features/faith_and_values/taking-on-the-blue-wall/article_cdc1058d-1b45-5f89-b166-
f85cb626bc66.html (“The experience led to a lawsuit and spurred the largest internal 
investigation in the state police’s history.”). 
 33 E.g., MILTON MOLLEN, THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE 
ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 53-58 (1994), https://www.scribd.com/document/248581606/ 
1994-07-07-Mollen-Commission-NYPD-Report (finding evidence of a “code of 
silence” within the NYPD); WARREN CHRISTOPHER, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 31 (1991) [hereinafter 
CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION], https://web.archive.org/web/20110722124708/http://www. 
parc.info/client_files/Special%20Reports/1%20-%20Chistopher%20Commision.pdf 
(finding a pattern of excessive force as well as a fundamentally flawed reporting 
system within the LAPD). 
 34 CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 168. 
 35 See, e.g., Code of Silence, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH n.131, n.133, n.134, 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/police/uspo27.htm (citing, in order, Jeff 
Gammage, Code of Silence: A Barrier to Truth in Investigations of Police, PHILADELPHIA 
INQUIRER, May 5, 1996; Susan Finch, NOPD Told to Put Stop to Brutality, TIMES-
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The culture of silence is not limited to rank and file police officers. 
Both police unions and departmental management are complicit. A 
report from the Police Accountability Task Force in Chicago, where 
Laquan McDonald was shot, concluded that “[t]he collective 
bargaining agreements between the police unions and the City have 
essentially turned the code of silence into official policy.”36 According 
to the report, the agreements discourage reporting, make it easy for 
officers to lie, and require destruction of evidence of misconduct after 
several years.37 Similarly, a DOJ report on the Baltimore Police 
Department found that the department’s inconsistent responses to 
complaints resulted in an unwillingness on the part of officers to 
report, particularly in light of the risk of retaliation.38 
Regardless of the enterprise, the best way to ensure oversight and 
organizational compliance is often through self-reporting.39 
“Employees are particularly effective at promoting compliance because 
 
PICAYUNE, May 20, 1993; and Dick Lehr, Department Unwilling to Face Brutal Facts, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 1997). 
 36 POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM: RESTORING 
TRUST BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE 14 (2006), 
https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF-Complete-Recommendations-
.pdf [hereinafter PATF REPORT]; see also Stephen Rushin, Response to When Police Kill, 22 
BERK. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2018) at 3-7, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3154036&download=yes (detailing research regarding the 
impact of union contracts, civil service rules, and law enforcement officers bills of rights 
on the ability of police departments to investigate and hold officers accountable for police 
violence); Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1240-43 (2017) 
(arguing based on study of 178 police collective bargaining contracts that contractually 
required disciplinary procedures limit police accountability).  
 37 PATF REPORT, supra note 36. 
 38 BALTIMORE REPORT, supra note 26, at 128 (“BPD does not consistently classify, 
investigate, adjudicate, and document complaints of misconduct according to its own 
policies and accepted law enforcement standards.”). 
 39 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (“[G]overnment employees 
are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they 
work . . . .”); see also Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of 
Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 375 (2005) (noting that in passing Sarbanes-
Oxley, Congress recognized “the enormous regulatory potential” in encouraging and 
protecting whistleblowers); Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: 
An Institutional Perspective, 19 L. & POL’Y 363, 363-64 (1997) (noting the potential of 
individual and industry self-regulation to effect compliance with normative social 
values); Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) (recognizing that prosecutions 
for public corruption often depend on the testimony of fellow government 
employees); San Diego v. Roe, 543 U. S. 77, 80-82 (2004) (recognizing the public 
interest in receiving information from public employees); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 
U.S. 410, 428 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the public’s interest in 
receiving such information is no less when the employee’s speech is pursuant to job 
duties). 
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of their placement and ability to detect unlawful behavior.”40 Courts 
and legislatures have long recognized this fact, consistently re-
affirming the importance of statutes protecting whistleblowers from 
retaliatory employment action.41 These sorts of protections often 
intertwine, overlap, and supplement protections for public employees 
supplied by the First Amendment. However, over the course of the last 
two decades, First Amendment protection for public employees has 
been eroded by Supreme Court precedent, leaving a void. This void 
chills self-reporting, strengthening the thin blue line. The modern 
public interest in oversight of police practices merits a re-examination 
of the current approach to protection for government employee speech 
under Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
II. THE PICKERING TEST 
For nearly forty years, the Constitutional free speech rights 
guaranteed to public employees by the First Amendment were 
delineated by a balancing test articulated in Pickering v. Board of 
Education.42 In 1964, Marvin L. Pickering, an Illinois teacher, wrote a 
letter to the editor of his local newspaper.43 Like many of his fellow 
citizens, Pickering was concerned with the machinations of the 
District 205 Board of Education.44 In the years leading up to 
Pickering’s letter, the Board had attempted to pass several pieces of 
local legislation — namely bond proposals and tax hikes aimed at 
raising funds for two new schools in the district.45 The letter criticized 
the Board for its allocation of resources between academic and athletic 
programs, and alleged that the superintendent of schools was 
suppressing dissent from teachers with respect to the funding issue.46 
In response to his letter, the Board dismissed Pickering from his 
position.47 Pickering challenged the dismissal as a violation of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.48 In 1968, his case came before the 
United States Supreme Court.49 It would go on to become a watershed 
 
 40 Nancy M. Modesitt, The Garcetti Virus, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 137, 155 (2011). 
 41 Id. at 154-56. 
 42 Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 43 Id. at 564 
 44 Id. at 566. 
 45 Id. at 565-66. 
 46 Id. at 566. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 565. 
 49 Id. 
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case in Constitutional employment law, defining the First Amendment 
rights of public employees for decades to come. 
The Pickering Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Marshall, 
held that Pickering’s letter to the editor was speech protected by the 
First Amendment and that the Board’s subsequent dismissal was 
unlawful.50 The touchstone of the analysis, for Justice Marshall, was 
the idea of “public concern.”51 Drawing on a rich history of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, the Pickering Court held that, “statements 
by public officials on matters of public concern must be accorded First 
Amendment protection despite the fact that the statements are 
directed at their nominal superiors.”52 Ultimately, Pickering came to be 
known for its efforts to balance the rights of the public employee, who 
is also a citizen, against the rights of the public employer.53 The so-
called “Pickering balancing test” spawned out of these efforts. 
Under this balancing test, a court first examines whether the 
challenged speech entails a matter of public concern.54 This is based 
on an inquiry into its content, form and context.55 Then, if it is 
satisfied that a matter of public concern is implicated, a court proceeds 
with a rigorous, fact-specific balancing of employer and employee 
interests.56 Furthermore, under the balancing test, the court will assess 
the context in which the dispute arose.57 
For several decades, this balancing approach controlled First 
Amendment speech claims brought against public employers. The 
Pickering test remained largely unchanged until 2006, when Richard 
Ceballos arrived before the Supreme Court, alleging that his employer, 
the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, had unlawfully 
 
 50 Id. at 574-75. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 574 (citing Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) and Wood 
v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962)). 
 53 Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) 
(“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of [a public 
employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the 
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services 
it performs through its employees.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 158 
(1983) (applying the Pickering test to discharge of the Assistant District Attorney). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 (“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter 
of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given 
statement, as revealed by the whole record.”). 
 56 Id. at 150-54 (“The Pickering balance requires full consideration of the 
government’s interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to 
the public.”). 
 57 Id. at 153. 
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disciplined him for exercising his First Amendment rights.58 In 
addressing the merits of his case, the Supreme Court sounded a retreat 
from the Pickering balancing test and, in doing so, erected a high 
barrier between public employees and their First Amendment 
retaliation protections. 
III. GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS 
In early 2000, Richard Ceballos, an Assistant District Attorney in 
Los Angeles County, was asked by a defense attorney to review the 
affidavits supporting a crucial search warrant in a pending criminal 
case.59 The defense attorney was concerned about potential 
misrepresentations or inaccuracies and appealed to Ceballos in his role 
as calendar deputy to investigate further.60 Ceballos examined the 
affidavit itself, visited the location it described, and spoke with the 
warrant affiant on several occasions.61 He determined that, in his 
opinion, the affidavit contained serious misrepresentations and 
recommended that the case be dismissed.62 Ceballos memorialized all 
of this information in memoranda to his supervisors in the District 
Attorney’s Office.63 In response to Ceballos’s concerns, his supervisors 
arranged a meeting with representatives from the sheriff’s department 
to discuss the affidavit.64 According to Ceballos, discussions at the 
meeting were intense and a lieutenant criticized Ceballos for the 
manner in which he dealt with the case.65 Despite the issues Ceballos 
raised, his superiors pursued the prosecution.66 Ceballos was called as 
a witness by the defense and testified about his observations and 
opinions regarding the search warrant.67 Following this ordeal, 
Ceballos alleged that he suffered several adverse employment 
consequences — reassignment, transfer to another courthouse, and 
denial of a promotion as a result of engaging in protected First 
Amendment speech.68 
 
 58 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 410 (2006). 
 59 Id. at 413. 
 60 Id. at 413-14. 
 61 Id. at 414. 
 62 Id.  
 63 Id. 
 64 Id.  
 65 Id.  
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 414-15. 
 68 Id. at 415. 
  
2018] Crossing the Thin Blue Line 13 
The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Kennedy, 
held that Ceballos’ reports to his superiors did not constitute speech 
protected by the First Amendment.69 In so doing, the Court 
reconceived the strictures of the Pickering balancing test. Specifically, 
the Court established a threshold question for public employees 
challenging adverse employment action on First Amendment 
grounds.70 Under Garcetti, a court’s first task is to determine whether 
the employee’s challenged conduct occurred pursuant to official job 
duties.71 If the speech is pursuant to job responsibilities, “the 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, 
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from 
employer discipline.”72 This principle serves as a categorical bar to 
relief under the First Amendment and precludes application of the 
Pickering balancing test. 
IV. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Criticisms of Garcetti 
Almost since its inception, scholars and researchers have recognized 
the inconsistencies in the Garcetti holding and the difficulties that it 
presents in terms of application.73 First, and foremost, among these 
 
 69 Id. at 424-26. 
 70 Id. at 426; Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014) (“In Garcetti, we 
described a two-step inquiry into whether a public employee’s speech is entitled to 
protection: ‘The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on 
a matter of public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment 
cause of action based on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech.’” (quoting 
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418)); Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 701-03 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (describing the findings of various circuits that whether the employee 
spoke as an employee is a threshold question in First Amendment cases after 
Garcetti). 
 71 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (“The First Amendment protects some expressions 
related to the speaker’s job . . . . when public employees make statements pursuant to 
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from 
employer discipline.”). 
 72 Id. 
 73 See, e.g., Renee Newman Knake, Lawyer Speech in the Regulatory State, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2099, 2120 (2016) (criticizing restrictions on the speech of 
government lawyers); Martha M. McCarthy & Suzanne E. Eckes, Silence in the 
Hallways: The Impact of Garcetti v. Ceballos on Public School Educators, 17 B.U. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 209, 226-29 (2008) (criticizing application of Garcetti to school employees); 
John E. Rumel, Public Employee Speech: Answering the Unanswered and Related 
Questions in Lane v. Franks, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 243, 246 (2017) (arguing 
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criticisms is the allegation that Garcetti creates an “artificial 
dichotomy” between a public employee in the role of citizen and in 
the role of employee.74 In the abstract, this distinction is both “false 
and unprecedented,”75 relying as it does on the dubious principle that 
only speech “as a citizen” is protected by the First Amendment. This 
principle does not appear anywhere in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.76 Nor does it comport with the Court’s recognition of 
“corporate speech” as a category of conduct protected by the First 
Amendment.77 At the same time, this dichotomy results in the logical 
inconsistency recognized by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Garcetti, 
 
Garcetti should be overruled); Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Employment Law: 
Zimmer’s Intuition on the Future of Employee Free Speech Law, 20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 393, 415 (2016) (discussing ‘“reason-specific protections” and the limiting of 
free-speech rights by Garcetti); Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First 
Amendment Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117, 143-44 
(2009) [hereinafter Garcetti’s Impact] (criticizing application to the speech of federal 
employees); Tyler Wiese, Seeing Through the Smoke: “Official Duties” in the Wake of 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, ABA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 509, 529 (2010) (analyzing the chain-of-
command analysis versus the assigned-responsibilities analysis, and finding the latter 
more consistent with Garcetti); Jason Zenor, This Is Just Not Working for Us: Why after 
Ten Years on the Job - It Is Time to Fire Garcetti, 19 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 101, 123 
(2016) (analyzing Garcetti and arguing “[t]he [Supreme] Court should have refocused 
the emphasis of the employee speech doctrine back toward whether or not the speech 
was a matter of public concern”). Some scholars, however, are less troubled by the 
case. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos 
Makes Sense, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 659-60 (2012) (arguing public employee 
speech has “low First Amendment value” due to a general governmental inability to 
make “context-sensitive judgments about the quality of speech or its social 
appropriateness”). 
 74 See, e.g., Ramona L. Paetzold, When Are Public Employees Not Really Public 
Employees? In the Aftermath of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 92, 96 
(2008) (noting that once an individual is employed it is difficult to immediately 
separate their speech into two distinct categories of “citizen” and “employee”); 
Garcetti’s Impact, supra note 73, at 123 (rejecting the “dichotomous, overly-formalistic 
view of a public employee as either being a citizen or worker, but never 
simultaneously both”). 
 75 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court: October Term 2005, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 
335, 340 (2006). 
 76 See id. 
 77 See id. (“The fact that the corporations are not citizens did not matter because it 
is the right of listeners, according to the Supreme Court, that is paramount.”); see also 
Citizen’s United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (“The 
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate 
identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of 
nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”). 
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namely that “it is senseless to let constitutional protection for exactly 
the same words hinge on whether they fall within a job description.”78 
In practice, the dichotomy has produced inconsistent results. 
Several subsequent cases illustrate the problem. In Morales v. Jones, the 
Seventh Circuit held that a police officer’s conversations with his 
superiors concerning an arrest were part of the officer’s job duties and 
thus outside the purview of First Amendment protections.79 At the 
same time, the court concluded that statements stemming from the 
same arrest, when made at a deposition for the purposes of a section 
1983 action80 were not part of the employee’s job duties and merited 
protection.81 In Jackler v. Byrne, the Second Circuit concluded that a 
police officer’s failure to make a false statement at the behest of his 
superiors did not amount to performance of job duties.82 And yet, in 
Huppert v. City of Pittsburgh, the Ninth Circuit held that a police 
officer’s grand jury testimony concerning corruption within the 
department83 was employee speech and could not serve as the basis of 
a section 1983 claim for retaliation.84 
With respect to testimony in court, in Lane v. Franks, the Supreme 
Court found that employee Lane’s testimony in a former employee’s 
trial on corruption charges was protected by the First Amendment.85 
The Court emphasized, however, that the job of a director of a 
community college program did not involve testifying in court.86 In 
Justice Thomas’ concurrence, he highlighted the narrow scope of the 
majority opinion. Specifically, he noted that the Court did not answer 
the question of how testifying affects public employees, such as police 
officers, whose job duties indeed include testifying in court.87 In 
 
 78 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427. 
 79 Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2007).  
 80 Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
 81 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 185 (1961) (overruled in part on other 
grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)) (showing 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 expressly creates a private right of action to enforce constitutional claims arising 
“under color of state law”). 
 82 Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 234, 244-45 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 83 It is worth noting that both statutory law and department policy compelled the 
officer’s truthful testimony. Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 707-09 (9th 
Cir. 2009).  
 84 Id. (overruled by Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013)). Although 
Huppert was later overruled, that fact does not sufficiently mitigate the problems 
created by Garcetti. Id.; see also infra notes 126-151, 193-218 and accompanying text. 
 85 Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379-80 (2014).  
 86 Id. at 2378-79. 
 87 Id. at 2384 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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finding the speech protected, the Court did emphasize the significance 
of the fact that Lane’s testimony was about public corruption, stating: 
[i]t would be antithetical to our jurisprudence to conclude 
that the very kind of speech necessary to prosecute corruption 
by public officials — speech by public employees regarding 
information learned through their employment — may never 
form the basis for a First Amendment retaliation claim. Such a 
rule would place public employees who witness corruption in 
an impossible position, torn between the obligation to testify 
truthfully and the desire to avoid retaliation and keep their 
jobs.88 
It might be argued that this language should bring comfort to police 
officers considering speaking out about public corruption. Several 
factors, however, lead to the opposite conclusion. First, an officer 
must bring corruption to the attention of someone in authority before 
it can be prosecuted. Depending on the circumstances, such speech 
may be unprotected yet bring retaliatory action long prior to any 
possibly protected testimony. Second, as noted above, the concurrence 
suggested that police officers might have less protection for testimony 
than other employees.89 And finally, Lane actually lost his claim 
challenging his termination by Franks because of his testimony. The 
Court concluded that the law regarding speech protection for 
testimony was unclear at the time of Lane’s termination and therefore, 
Franks had qualified immunity.90 
The only practical differences between the holdings in these post-
Garcetti cases are the audience to whom the putatively protected 
speech was delivered, and the job descriptions and duties of the 
employees. In this respect, Garcetti produces results divorced from 
one of the key concerns highlighted by Pickering and its progeny: the 
public’s legitimate interest in being apprised of misconduct or areas of 
contention within their representative government. In fact, the 
Garcetti Court itself explicitly recognized this interest, conceding “the 
importance of promoting the public’s interest in receiving the well-
informed views of government employees engaging in civic 
discussion.”91 This is the entire purpose of the “public concern” 
 
 88 Id. at 2380. 
 89 Perhaps an officer might be able to claim that testimony about fellow officers’ 
unlawful conduct is not part of her job even though she regularly testifies in court for 
other purposes. This seems a slim reed on which to risk retaliation and job loss. 
 90 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381-83. 
 91 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006). 
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inquiry that characterizes the Pickering test.92 And yet, Garcetti 
subverts this interest and subjects the issue of public concern to a 
restrictive and wholly arbitrary dichotomy that produces inconsistent 
and illogical results. 
Along similar lines, Garcetti has faced criticism for failing to provide 
guidance to courts on how to properly differentiate between employee 
speech and citizen speech in the context of public employment.93 The 
Garcetti Court gave lower courts no workable schema for answering 
this question. It suggested that official job duties and descriptions, 
while possibly illustrative, did not end the inquiry, and further 
cautioned that courts should be hesitant to construe a public 
employee’s job duties too narrowly.94 This lack of guidance has 
produced myriad approaches in the lower courts. 
Here, it will also be helpful to look at a few practical examples. The 
Second Circuit’s jurisprudence on the issue focuses on the 
identification of “civilian analogues.”95 The inquiry hinges in large 
part on whether the employee’s challenged conduct can properly be 
analogized to some form of citizen speech. Thus, in Weintraub, a 
teacher’s complaint about classroom disorder, which took the form of 
an employee grievance with the union, was not protected because 
there was no civilian analogue to a union complaint.96 Conversely, in 
Jackler, a police officer’s refusal to give false evidence had a civilian 
analogue because a citizen has “the right to reject governmental efforts 
to require him to make statements he believes are false.”97 Whether or 
not one agrees with the logic of these decisions, it is quite evident how 
far afield the analysis has gone from the limited instructions provided 
in Garcetti. 
Other circuits put dispositive weight on the chain of command, 
consistently holding that public employees who report concerns to 
their supervisors are not insulated from retaliatory employment 
action.98 In Davis v. McKinney, the Fifth Circuit addressed 
 
 92 Id. 
 93 Paetzold, supra note 74, at 97. 
 94 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424-25. 
 95 See, e.g., Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 229, 241 (2011) (finding speech 
protected by the First Amendment because it had a “civilian analogue”); Weintraub v. 
Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New York, 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d. Cir. 
2010) (holding that petitioner had no First Amendment protections as his “filing of 
[a] grievance was in furtherance of one of his core duties as a public school teacher, 
maintaining class discipline, and had no relevant analogue to citizen speech”). 
 96 Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 198.  
 97 Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241. 
 98 See Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 313 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Forraker v. 
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communications from an internal auditor regarding the financial 
solvency of the University of Texas.99 The court concluded that those 
communications that went up the chain of the command did not merit 
protection under the Garcetti framework.100 In Dahlia v. Rodriguez, the 
Ninth Circuit addressed the case of a police officer who reported 
internal misconduct to his superiors and later to an Internal Affairs 
Department.101 The court noted that the chain-of-command analysis 
employed by the Fifth Circuit was enlightening but not dispositive.102 
The court went on to highlight three guiding principles by which it 
would decide this case and others going forward: the chain of 
command, the content of the employee communication, and the 
orders or directions of the employer (including whether or not the 
employee complied).103 The focus on the chain of command may be 
particularly problematic for police officers, who work in a quasi-
military hierarchical organization.104 Workplace and social norms 
encourage internal reporting, and the culture in a military-like 
organization is even more likely to encourage, if not require, reporting 
in the chain of command.105 
 
Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that troopers’ complaints to a 
State Auditor were adequately within the chain of command and thus not protected by 
the First Amendment); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 545 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that an officer’s communications with a state senator and inspector general regarding 
sexual harassment did not involve the chain of command, as her job duties did not 
involve contacting either, and thus constituted First Amendment protected speech); 
Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding an employee’s 
act of notifying her supervising officials about signs of fraud and inaccuracies was not 
protected free speech as it was pursuant to official responsibilities). 
 99 Davis, 518 F.3d at 307-09. 
 100 Id. at 315-16. Consider the consequences of applying this sort of approach to a 
case like Jackler. In Jackler, a police officer made a report of misconduct to his 
superiors but was disciplined for failing to alter the report to provide false 
information. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241. Would the Davis v. McKinney test bar recovery? 
The report was made pursuant to Jackler’s job duties, as a departmental directive 
required officers present during use of force to file a report. Thus, under the standard 
chain-of-command analysis the report is not protected. One could also argue that the 
order to change the report also renders the speech pursuant to job duties. This case 
could be analogized to Garcetti where the calendar deputy wrote a report about a 
search warrant’s reliability with which his supervisors disagreed. 
 101 Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1074-75. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 1074-76. 
 104 See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 8, at 722 (“Police departments are 
hierarchical, with a chain of command as in the military and a sharp division between 
the leadership and the rank-and-file.”). 
 105 See Modesitt, supra note 40, at 159-60 (highlighting that for reasons of 
confidentiality and social cohesiveness, reporting within the chain of command is 
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These differing approaches between the Circuits to resolving 
questions of law are not catastrophic problems. At the very least, 
however, they evince the lack of guidance provided by the Supreme 
Court in answering the citizen-employee speech question. But, it is 
important to recall the Garcetti framework and the stage of the 
analysis at which these approaches arise. Garcetti imposes a threshold 
issue for the analysis of public employee free speech. Thus, when a 
court uses one of the above approaches, and arrives at the conclusion 
that a public employee spoke as an employee, that ends the analysis 
and the employee’s recovery is barred. In this respect, the myriad 
approaches delineated above serve as barriers or hurdles, precluding 
access to Constitutional rights based on wholly arbitrary doctrinal 
constructs. 
Finally, Garcetti has faced opposition on policy grounds from those 
who assert that its holding chills employee speech on matters of public 
concern.106 This shortcoming is particularly relevant in the context of 
modern law enforcement, where the importance of oversight is 
heightened. The primary concern in this respect is that Garcetti 
discourages police officers from reporting misconduct or impropriety 
up the chain of command. And yet, bizarrely, Garcetti extends 
enhanced First Amendment protection to officers who go public with 
their accusations.107 If the interest of a public employer in having “a 
significant degree of control over their employees’ words and 
actions”108 is so compelling, why incentivize employee disclosure to 
outside enterprises? Again, this is especially damaging in the context 
of law enforcement, where there is already a culture of hostility toward 
officers who report on department misconduct. Officers who blow the 
whistle on their counterparts or report impropriety to an Internal 
Affairs department are often branded “disloyal” and shunned by the 
department at large.109 A study conducted on the Los Angeles Police 
 
often mandatory). 
 106 See Garcetti’s Impact, supra note 73, at 143 (concluding that “federal employee 
free speech claims [will] continue to suffer an unjust fate in this post-Garcetti world”); 
McCarthy & Eckes, supra note 73, at 219-24, 228-30 (detailing cases of school 
employee whistleblowers and showing that they are less likely to be protected from 
retaliation after Garcetti and citing various critics of the discouraging effect on 
reporting government misconduct). 
 107 Garcetti’s Impact, supra note 73, at 125-27. 
 108 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 
U.S. 138, 143 (1983)). 
 109 See, e.g., Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 100 F. Supp. 2d 78, 90 (D. Mass. 2000) 
(finding plaintiff police officer subjected to retaliation and adverse employment action 
where superiors believed he had reported misconduct to state investigative agencies); 
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Department in response to several high-profile instances of police 
misconduct discovered that the department routinely retaliated against 
“disloyal” officers by transferring them to unappealing posts far away 
from their homes.110 The practice was known as “freeway therapy.”111 
The application of Garcetti in this context makes it far less likely that 
misconduct or impropriety in law enforcement will be reported to 
superiors. And, because most of those who report wrongdoing report 
internally first,112 discouraging such reports makes any report 
unlikely. 
B. Police Officer Cases Pre- and Post-Garcetti 
A review of cases involving police officers before and after Garcetti 
confirms that the problems identified with the Garcetti holding have 
manifested themselves in the context of law enforcement. In general, 
officers in cases after Garcetti were more likely to lose their cases if 
they reported internally, while they were more likely to at least survive 
summary judgment if they reported externally.113 By way of contrast, 
pre-Garcetti cases focused on different factors. 
Before Garcetti, several factors surface in the cases as important in 
the determination of whether the speech of law enforcement officers 
warranted protection. The claims that failed tended to fall into one of 
several categories. First, some officers who revealed confidential 
information to the public in ways that impeded the ability of the police 
 
Walton v. Safir, 122 F. Supp. 2d 466, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding plaintiff police 
officer subjected to close scrutiny and adverse employment action where she spoke 
out publicly about racial bias in her former unit); Cochran v. City of Los Angeles, 222 
F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (cataloguing numerous instances of stigma and 
retaliatory action directed at officers of the LAPD who reported misconduct or 
cooperated with superiors). 
 110 Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545, 
583 (2001).  
 111 Id. 
 112 See Modesitt, supra note 40, at 159; What Price Free Speech? Whistleblowers and 
the Ceballos Decision: Hearing Before the Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. 2 
(2006) (statement of Stephan M. Kohn, National Whistleblower Center) [hereinafter 
Kohn] (showing most successful whistleblowers before Garcetti reported the problem 
internally first to their supervisor through the chain of command and the report 
typically related to their job duties); Will Kramer, Inside the Whistleblower’s World, 
WISC. LAW. Vol. 91, No. 3 (March 2018), available at https://www.wisbar.org/ 
NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=91&Issue=3&Article
ID=26212#a (citing research by the Ethics Resource Center indicating that 92% of 
whistleblowers initially reported malfeasance internally). 
 113 See infra notes 119-151 and accompanying text. 
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department to function effectively or served in a confidential capacity 
lost their claims because the department’s interest in effective 
operation outweighed the employee’s speech interest.114 In other cases, 
employees failed to prevail because their motives in speaking were 
personal, or even spiteful.115 Another factor that doomed some pre-
Garcetti cases is the lack of a reasonable factual basis for the officer’s 
speech.116 Officers who reported police misconduct through the chain 
of command, or other appropriate channels, without any such 
delimiting factors found their speech protected by the First 
Amendment.117 In some cases, even reporting allegations outside 
official channels was found to be protected.118 
In contrast, after Garcetti the cases frequently turn on whether the 
report was made through the chain of command or to an outside 
agency or internal affairs department. Courts that protect reports to 
outside agencies reason that such speech is not part of the employee’s 
job duties. In Spalding v. City of Chicago an officer was protected when 
he reported to the FBI because it was an outside law enforcement 
agency, and the report was made on his own initiative while he was 
off-duty.119 Another officer was protected after he spoke to the FBI 
 
 114 See, e.g., Pool v. VanRheen, 297 F.3d 899, 908-09 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding 
disruptive effects of reading of high level officer’s letter at a public meeting 
outweighed her free speech rights); Lytle v. City of Hayesville, 138 F.3d 857, 865, 867 
(10th Cir. 1998) (finding disruptive effects of external reporting using confidential 
information outweighed employee’s speech interest); Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 
57 F.3d 924, 933-34 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding demotion of officer permissible based 
in part on department’s interest in controlling the speech of its employees when they 
purport to speak for the department). 
 115 See, e.g., McMurphy v. City of Flushing, 802 F.2d 191, 196-98 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(finding spiteful motive rendered speech about suspected wrongful conduct 
unprotected). 
 116 See, e.g., Lytle, 138 F.3d at 867 (finding speech unprotected where the officer 
had little factual support for his allegations against other officers). 
 117 See, e.g., Blair v. City of Pomona, 223 F.3d 1074, 1076-78 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(reversing summary judgment after holding an officer’s complaints to the 
Department’s Major Crimes Task Force as potentially protected speech); Hare v. Zitek, 
414 F. Supp. 2d 834, 855-58 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (finding police officer’s speech about 
departmental corruption protected and not outweighed by employer’s interests where 
he reported to the State’s Attorney’s Office’s public integrity unit). 
 118 Forsyth v. City of Dallas, 91 F.3d 769, 772-74 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding jury 
verdict in favor of officers who directed their attorneys to publicize their allegations of 
illegal wiretapping after reporting to superior officers). 
 119 Spalding v. City of Chicago, 186 F. Supp. 3d 884, 898-99 (N.D. Ill. 2016); cf. 
Griffin v. City of New York, 880 F. Supp. 2d 384, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding a 
training manual’s broad description of an officer’s duties did not restrict plaintiff’s 
First Amendment protection as “it ‘would effectively curtail all [NYPD officers’] right 
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because he did so without the knowledge or permission of anyone else 
in the department.120 However, an officer is not protected when it is 
her duty to speak. This can happen when her department orders her to 
report to, or cooperate with an internal affairs or outside agency.121 
Other cases rely on the connection with job duties or the 
expectations of the employee. For example, the Seventh Circuit ruled 
against an officer who reported to her supervisor and the Internal 
Affairs Department that a fellow officer verbally abused her. The 
holding was based on the expectation that she report such incidents, 
particularly in a police department, where violent behavior poses a 
risk to the public and protecting the public is part of the officer’s 
job.122 The court went on to say that the report was “intimately 
connected” with her job duties.123 
Similarly, a police officer who reported to her superiors misconduct, 
corruption and abuse of suspects by fellow officers was deemed 
unprotected because she had “an official duty to report unlawful 
activity as well as misconduct.”124 The court went on to state that the 
officer “did not engage in communicating information of a concern to 
the general public as a private citizen but rather reported misconduct 
pursuant to her official duties as a police officer.”125 This case 
 
[] to speak out about corruption, thereby discouraging whistleblower activity that is of 
great benefit to civil society’” and thus finding report to Internal Affairs protected). 
 120 Howell v. Town of Ball, 827 F.3d 515, 524 (5th Cir. 2016) (reversing district 
court’s decision that speech was unprotected); see also Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 
1060, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding report to outside agency protected but report 
to supervisors unprotected).  
 121 See, e.g., Kasprzycki v. DiCarlo, 584 F. Supp. 2d 470, 476 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(finding report to internal affairs about missing money unprotected because the 
reporting police officer was told to report by his employer); cf. Griffin v. City of New 
York, 880 F. Supp. 2d 384, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that a manual indicating that 
all officers have a duty to report misconduct did not eliminate First Amendment 
protection for report to internal affairs.) 
 122 Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 481-82 (7th Cir. 2016). The court 
also noted that she was protecting the work environment. Id. 
 123 Id. at 482. 
 124 Hunt v. City of Portland, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1274 (D. Or. 2010), aff’d, 496 
F. App’x 751 (9th Cir. 2012), and aff’d, 599 F. App’x 620 (9th Cir. 2013). The court 
pointed to both the city’s rules requiring reporting of misconduct and the general duty 
to enforce the law. Id. 
 125 Id. at 1275; see also Crouse v. Town of Moncks Corner, 848 F.3d 576, 580-81, 
585 (4th Cir. 2017) (where the court found that the police chief was protected by 
qualified immunity because it was not clear that two police officers were speaking as 
citizens rather than employees where they visited an arrestee who was reportedly 
abused by another officer at his home in plainclothes on their lunch hour, providing 
him a complaint form and urging him to file a complaint against the officer). 
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illustrates the Catch-22 for police officers. They are obligated to report 
yet not protected from retaliation, at least on First Amendment 
grounds.126 And as the next section will illustrate, other protections 
are insufficient to fill the void. 
In a particularly problematic decision, Davis v. City of Chicago, the 
Seventh Circuit withheld First Amendment protection from a 
municipal employee charged with investigating allegations of police 
misconduct.127 As a supervisor in Chicago’s primary police oversight 
agency, the Independent Police Review Authority (“IPRA”), Lorenzo 
Davis was tasked with reviewing complaints levied against Chicago 
police officers, to determine whether the complaints had merit.128 
Davis’s findings were memorialized in a formal report, which 
summarized the allegations against the police and reached a 
conclusion on their validity.129 Davis alleged that between 2014 and 
2015, his supervisors at IPRA began pressuring him to “change 
‘sustained’ findings of police misconduct and to change his reports to 
reflect more favorably on the accused officers.”130 When Davis 
repeatedly refused this instruction, he was terminated.131 
Davis brought suit, arguing, inter alia, that he had been 
unconstitutionally terminated for exercising his First Amendment 
rights.132 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of 
Davis’s constitutional claim. Applying Garcetti and its own interpretive 
precedent, the court concluded that Davis, by virtue of his subordinate 
position within the departmental hierarchy, “was responsible for 
revising his reports at the direction of his superiors.”133 As such, the 
court reasoned that when Davis refused to perform these revisions at 
the behest of his superiors, “[his] refusal was pursuant to his job 
 
 126 See Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013) (Pregerson, J., 
specially concurring) (noting the Catch-22).  
 127 No. 16-1430, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 11985 (7th Cir. May 8, 2018). It is perhaps 
telling that this case arose in Chicago, where the Laquan McDonald shooting 
occurred. 
 128 Id. at *1-2. 
 129 Id. at *2. 
 130 Id. at *3. After investigating allegations of misconduct, the IPRA makes 
disciplinary recommendations that summarize the investigation and include findings. 
The report will state whether the allegations were found to be “sustained,” “not 
sustained,” “exonerated,” or “unfounded.” Id. at *2.  
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at *4. 
 133 Id. at *5. 
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duties” and therefore, “he spoke as a public employee rather than a 
private citizen.”134 
Davis provides still more empirical evidence of two major issues 
discussed thus far. First, Davis once again illustrates the contours of 
the thin blue line phenomenon woven throughout the precedent on 
this subject. And yet, Davis should give more pause than any of the 
cases examined to this point. In Davis, the thin blue line is not just a 
collection of officers laboring under a communal instinct for self-
preservation. Instead, here we see the thin blue line rendered at a 
higher level of abstraction, fully entrenched within the municipal 
policy of a major U.S. city. A far-reaching policy such as this 
implicates an even greater degree of public concern than does the 
typical law enforcement case arising under Garcetti. It is even more 
disappointing to see the analysis of conflicting interests subverted by 
the Seventh Circuit’s rigidly formulaic reliance on formal job duties at 
Garcetti’s threshold step. 
Second, Davis presents another example of a court struggling under 
the arbitrary and false dichotomy imposed by Garcetti, and the 
inconsistent and illogical results this struggle produces. In almost the 
same breath, the court both invokes Garcetti’s admonishment that the 
analysis of an employee’s job duties involves more than just a written 
job description, and simultaneously proceeds to dispose of the case on 
the basis of Davis’s job description as defined by Chicago’s Municipal 
Code.135 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Davis is 
inconsistent with other leading cases. For example, it would be fair to 
wonder how Davis squares with the Second Circuit’s holding in Jackler 
v. Byrne.136 That case, as discussed supra, involved an officer who 
“refused to make false statements of fact in an investigation of a 
civilian’s complaint that another officer had used excessive force.”137 
In granting the officer relief, the Second Circuit held that the police 
department lacked “authority to coerce or intimidate its employees to 
engage in criminal conduct by filing reports that are false in order to 
 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at *4-5 “Davis was responsible for revising his reports at the direction of his 
superiors. Indeed, Chicago’s Municipal Code assigned the power to make disciplinary 
recommendations to IPRA’s Chief Administrator, not a mid-level supervisor. Chi., Ill., 
Municipal Code § 2-57-040(h).” Id. at *5. 
 136 658 F.3d 225 (2011). 
 137 Davis v. City of Chicago, 889 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Jackler, 658 
F.3d at 230-31). 
  
2018] Crossing the Thin Blue Line 25 
conceal wrongdoing by another employee or to conceal eyewitness 
corroboration of civilian complaints of such wrongdoing.”138 
Judge Hamilton’s concurrence in Davis recognizes this inconsistency 
with its own holding. It offers only this tepid justification: that Jackler 
involved an officer’s refusal to make false statements of fact, while 
Davis alleged that his termination stemmed from his “refusing to 
accept his boss’s different evaluations of facts.”139 Assuming arguendo 
that this distinction carries any legal import, this line of reasoning 
demonstrates just how far afield the Garcetti inquiry has led the lower 
courts. Instead of balancing the interests of employer and employee 
with an eye to keeping the public informed on matters of great 
importance, this court was persuaded by a dubious, semantic 
distinction between facts and evaluations of facts. The Constitution 
demands better. 
Finally, two Ninth Circuit opinions, Huppert v. City of Pittsburg140 
and Dahlia v. Rodriguez141 further illustrate the struggles of the courts 
to apply Garcetti. In Huppert, the officer alleged several First 
Amendment violations. He cooperated with the District Attorney in an 
investigation of the Public Works Department and later investigated 
police department corruption.142 Because he was assigned to both of 
these investigations, his speech was deemed unprotected, even though 
he was instructed to stop the latter investigation by one supervising 
officer while told to continue by another.143 His third claim was that 
he reported corruption in his department to the FBI on his own time 
and without any departmental orders.144 Nevertheless, the court found 
that his job duties included investigation of corruption and therefore 
any speech to the FBI was unprotected.145 Finally, he claimed 
retaliation based on his grand jury testimony about police department 
corruption but the court found that testimony before grand juries 
 
 138 Jackler, 658 F.3d at 242. 
 139 Davis, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 11985, at *7. 
 140 574 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 141 735 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 142 Huppert, 574 F.3d at 703-06. 
 143 Id. at 705-06. 
 144 Id. at 706-07. 
 145 Id. at 707. The court relied on California case law holding that the duties of a 
police officer include crime prevention, crime detection, and disclosure of any 
information relating to criminal activity. Id. As a result, the court concluded that the 
fact that he engaged in the speech on his own volition and own time was not 
determinative, id., although similar facts led to a determination in Spalding, that the 
speech was citizen speech. Spalding v. City of Chicago, 186 F. Supp. 3d 884, 898-99, 
905 (N.D. Ill. 2016). 
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about corruption was expected of police officers and therefore the 
testimony was unprotected speech.146 
Four years later, the Dahlia court reversed Huppert, criticizing the 
court for failing to make a “‘practical’, fact-specific inquiry” into the 
job duties of the officer.147 The Dahlia court found that the Huppert 
court properly used the “‘practical’ inquiry” to find the cooperation 
with the District Attorney and continuation of the corruption 
investigation unprotected, but failed to properly apply the test to the 
speech to the FBI and the grand jury.148 Applying its test to the 
officer’s speech in Dahlia, the court found that his report up the chain 
of command about abuse of witnesses and suspects was unprotected 
employee speech.149 With respect to the allegations that the officer 
suffered retaliation for speech about the abuse to the Internal Affairs 
Department, his union, and an outside agency, the court reversed the 
district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim.150 However, the 
court left open the possibility that his duties might include these 
reports, depending on what was revealed in discovery.151 
These two cases reveal the difficulties in distinguishing employee 
speech from citizen speech. Additionally, they show that it is common 
in cases involving police officer reports of corruption and abuse for 
complaints to be made to various entities. This results in a 
commingling of the two types of speech defined in Garcetti, thereby 
confusing the issues even further for employers, courts, and 
employees. If there were truly other protections for employees that did 
not raise these same issues, the application of Garcetti would not be as 
concerning. But as the next section demonstrates, other laws do not 
provide the protection that law enforcement officers need. 
V. OTHER PROTECTIONS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
Before Garcetti, the First Amendment was understood to provide the 
“ultimate whistleblower protection”152 by insulating public employees 
from retaliation. With this protection largely gutted by Garcetti, all 
 
 146 Id. at 707-08. 
 147 Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 148 Id. at 1070-71. 
 149 Id. at 1076.  
 150 Id. at 1077-78. 
 151 Id. Dahlia will be discussed further infra to assess how the Pickering framework 
improves the analysis of police officer cases. See infra notes 193-218 and 
accompanying text. 
 152 Joel Gora, First Amendment Decisions in the October 2005 Term, 22 TOURO L. 
REV. 917, 926 (2007). 
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that remains to shield public employees are statutory remedies. In fact, 
the Garcetti majority noted this fact and contended that whistleblower 
laws at the state and federal level were sufficient to protect employees 
from adverse employment action.153 This is a dubious contention. 
The whistleblower laws are rife with gaps in protection. As is 
evidenced by post-Garcetti case law,154 reporting the misconduct of 
other police officers internally will often be considered part of an 
officer’s job duties. It may be explicitly required by an employee 
handbook or job description, or may be inferred because their job is to 
enforce the law.155 Of course, this is the problem with Garcetti, but the 
problem is also present in many whistleblower statutes.156 The federal 
Whistleblower Protection Act was amended in 2012 to cover 
employees making reports as part of their job duties.157 While that is a 
positive development, the application to police officers is not yet clear 
and, in any event, most police officers are employees of state and local 
governments. Many state whistleblower statutes do not contain 
explicit protection for “internal/official duty whistleblowers”158 and 
some have been interpreted to exclude them from protection.159 
The coverage of whistleblower statutes varies widely, resulting in 
exclusion of some law enforcement officers altogether. For example, 
some state statutes do not cover employees of subdivisions like 
municipalities or counties, thereby excluding many police officers.160 
 
 153 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425-26 (2006). 
 154 See supra notes 119-151 and accompanying text. 
 155 See supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text. 
 156 According to research by the National Whistleblower Center following the 
Garcetti decision, only fifty-eight percent of states protected “internal, official-duty” 
whistleblowers. Kohn, supra note 112, at 5. Some states have since expanded coverage 
of their laws. See infra note 158.  
 157 See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(1)(A), (G)(2) (specifying protection for disclosures made 
to supervisors and disclosures “made during the normal course of duties of the 
employee.”); Jason Zuckerman, Congress Strengthens Whistleblower Protections for 
Federal Employees, ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FLASH (Nov.-Dec. 2012), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ll_flash/1212_abalel_ 
flash/lel_flash12_2012spec.html.  
 158 Kohn, supra note 112, at 17-18. A few states have interpreted their statutes to 
protect internal/official duty whistleblowers since 2006. See, e.g., Igwe v. City of 
Miami, 208 So. 3d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016); Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 119 A.3d 
215 (N.J. 2015) (finding protection for such employees); Brown v. Mayor of Detroit, 
734 N.W.2d 514, 517 (Mich. 2007). 
 159 See Modesitt, supra note 40, at 168-76 (discussing increasing number of 
employers in state whistleblower cases asserting an exception to protection for 
internal/job duties whistleblowing and courts in several states that have adopted the 
exclusion). 
 160 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-26A-3 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-50.5-102(3) 
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Additionally, the Arkansas Supreme Court recently dismissed the 
claim of a state employee under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act, 
holding that the legislature did not have the authority to waive the 
state’s sovereign immunity from suit.161 
Other states have specific requirements for coverage that may not be 
met where the employee has no knowledge of the technical 
requirements for protection. For example, in Alabama, the disclosure 
must be made under oath or by affidavit,162 while in Delaware the 
report must be made to an elected official, including employees of the 
office of the elected official.163 Similarly, Florida requires that the 
report be made to the Chief Executive Officer of the local government 
or “other appropriate official.”164 Just who is an “appropriate official” 
has been the subject of litigation, with the Florida District Court of 
Appeals stating “the protection extends to disclosures to members of 
boards, committees, departments, or divisions affiliated with the 
offending governmental entity, so long as the board, committee, 
department, or division has the authority to investigate, police, 
manage, or otherwise remedy the violation or act by the violating 
governmental entity.”165 Does this include the police officer’s 
supervisor? A higher level official within the police department? 
A police officer who wishes to report police misconduct is unlikely 
to be aware of such nuances. The appropriate time to report may be 
immediately after an incident occurs, or perhaps as part of a mandated 
report. This gives little time to consult with any knowledgeable 
adviser. 
Other states’ whistleblower statutes have different technical 
requirements for coverage. This can include a mandated initial 
disclosure to the employee’s supervisor in order for protection to 
attach,166 or a requirement that the report be in writing.167 In these 
 
(2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-10-1, 4 (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN § 75-2973 (2010). 
 161 Arkansas Community Correction v. Barnes, 2018 Ark. 122 (Apr. 12, 2018). 
 162 See ALA. CODE § 36-26A-3 (1975). 
 163 See DEL. CODE. ANN. Tit. 29, § 5115 (1995). This seems unlikely to include 
superior officers in the police department. See also MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-9-173 (1999) 
(requiring disclosure to a state investigative body). 
 164 See FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(6) (2002). 
 165 Rustowicz v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 174 So. 3d 414, 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2015). 
 166 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-4 (2006) (with limited exceptions, protecting 
disclosures to public bodies only if the employee first discloses to a supervisor in 
writing and provides the employer with an opportunity to correct the problem); N.Y. 
LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 2006). This mandate, if followed, would likely eliminate 
protection under the First Amendment because such a report would likely constitute 
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states, the police officer whose supervisor is part of the problem or the 
officer who makes an oral report may be unprotected. And while some 
states have exceptions to the requirement of an initial internal report, 
the officer may be unable to ascertain in advance whether the 
exception applies.168 
In addition to confusing and problematic technical requirements, 
ninety-five percent of state laws provided fewer remedial or procedural 
protections than would be afforded by the First Amendment.169 These 
differences may discourage reporting as well for those who consult 
with knowledgeable advisers before taking action. 
Federal law also has specific requirements that may be difficult to 
satisfy in a typical case. Under the Whistleblower Protection Act, case 
law requires “an employee complaining of retaliation to show 
irrefutable proof that the person criticized was not acting in good faith 
and in compliance with the law.”170 Moreover, federal employees are 
not protected in the case of “statements of facts publicly known 
already.”171 In a given situation, whether a disclosure meets these 
requirements may be difficult to ascertain in advance. 
All of this contributes to the picture painted by Justice Souter’s 
dissent of a “patchwork” system of protection for public employees, 
“not a showing that worries may be remitted to legislatures for 
relief.”172 Close examination reveals that protections for public 
employee whistleblowers are a far cry from “the powerful network of 
legislative enactments . . . available to those who seek to expose 
wrongdoing.”173 
As for police unions, they have been identified as both obstacles to 
reform and agents for reform.174 Typically, union membership 
 
employee speech. See Kohn, supra note 112, at 6; cases cited supra notes 122-126, 149 
and accompanying text. 
 167 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 39.90.110(c) (2010) (allowing employer to require 
a report in writing to the employer prior to reporting a matter of public concern under 
the statute with limited exceptions); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.341 (2017). 
 168 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-11-103 (2013) (dispensing with the requisite 
supervisory report if the individual reasonably believes it will not correct the problem 
but then requiring report to the agency head or the office of the governor). 
 169 Kohn, supra note 112, at 6. 
 170 Public Employees, 2 Manual on Employment Discrimination § 10:16 (citing 
Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 171 Id. (citing Francisco v. Office of Personnel Management, 295 F.3d 1310, 1314 
(Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 172 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 440 (2006) (Souter J., dissenting). 
 173 Id. at 425. 
 174 See generally Fisk & Richardson, supra note 8 and sources cited therein.  
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provides an expressive conduit for the rank-and-file police officer so 
often suppressed by the police department’s rigid, hierarchical 
structure.175 Union representation gives officers an outlet to air 
grievances and participate in policymaking that would not otherwise 
exist.176 However, union representation may in fact impede reform 
efforts by providing categorical protection to officers who engage in 
misconduct or improper police practices.177 For example, police union 
contracts often “contain provisions that protect officers accused of 
misconduct, shield them from civilian oversight, and limit the ability 
to change officers’ conditions of employment, which also makes it 
difficult to enact reforms such as setting up early warning systems.”178 
These provisions offer protection not only to officers who engage in 
misconduct, but also to officers who report misconduct, potentially 
shielding them from unjust discipline. Yet, given the culture of silence 
that is typical of police departments and the systemic problems of 
police violence,179 it seems unlikely that officers who are breaking the 
code would rely on their unions for protection. It is always 
challenging for unions to handle cases involving conflicts between 
members when they have a duty to represent all members fairly.180 
And, where there is strong organizational pressure to protect fellow 
officers and union officials are elected, their incentive to support the 
whistleblower reporting a fellow officer is reduced.181 Further, while 
the union contract may insulate the individual officer from adverse 
employment consequences based on reporting misconduct, it is not a 
substitute for First Amendment rights and protections. 
Few other legal protections exist for officers retaliated against for 
reporting police misconduct.182 As a result of Garcetti, “public 
 
 175 Fisk & Richardson, supra note 8, at 726-28 (“[P]olice officers responded to . . . 
[a] hierarchical and punitive supervisory structure by forming unions.”). 
 176 Id. at 738-40, 759-66. 
 177 See id. at 717-18 and sources cited therein. 
 178 Id. at 749 (citation omitted). 
 179 See Chemerinsky, supra note 110, at 573-75 (describing the culture of silence in 
the Los Angeles Police Department); Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and 
Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 495-507 (2004) (describing a systemic 
culture of violence in many police departments). 
 180 Fisk & Richardson, supra note 8, at 715. 
 181 Id. at 715, 748. 
 182 If an employee’s whistleblowing complaints involved complaints of violation of 
state or federal statute, the employee might have a retaliation claim under the 
particular statute alleged to be violated. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting 
discrimination for opposing unlawful practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
or for filing a charge of discrimination or participating in an investigation of 
discrimination); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (same regarding Age Discrimination in 
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employees now enjoy only the types of protections that private 
employees enjoy for their undesirable workplace speech.”183 This is a 
dramatic step back from the protections afforded in the wake of 
Pickering. 
VI. A RETURN TO PICKERING 
As the previous sections have demonstrated, Garcetti is excessively 
restrictive and creates a substantial chilling effect on public employee 
speech. This is particularly true in the context of law enforcement. 
The solution is a return to the Pickering test that controlled these 
disputes until the decision in Garcetti. 
In effect, this is the approach suggested by Justices Stevens and 
Souter in their dissenting opinions in Garcetti.184 Justice Souter’s 
opinion in particular highlights the problems with the majority’s 
framework, many of which have been examined in detail in the above 
sections, as well as the benefits of returning to the more lenient 
strictures of the Pickering test. The fallacy of the arbitrary dichotomy 
of citizen-employee speech, the subversion of the public interest in 
effective governance, and the inadequacy of statutory remedies for 
protecting public employees who express dissent all require a return 
to the Pickering balancing test without the Garcetti gloss. A return to 
the Pickering test would alleviate many of these concerns. 
First of all, the Pickering test is desirable in that it removes the 
arbitrary and fallacious distinction between employee and citizen 
speech. No longer would lower courts be forced to fashion arbitrary 
decisions governing what constitutes employee speech and what 
constitutes citizen speech. At the same time, removing that forced 
distinction would allow for the possibility, contemplated in some case 
law but largely unexplored, that citizen speech and employee speech 
are often inextricably linked.185 
Additionally, a return to the Pickering test would place the focus of 
the inquiry once again on the public interest in governmental 
 
Employment Act). 
 183 Paetzold, supra note 74, at 108. 
 184 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the case should have been decided in accordance with the precedent set by 
Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979), with no 
examination of employee-citizen speech); id. at 427-29 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(arguing for application of the Pickering test). 
 185 See, e.g., Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 311, 314 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(acknowledging “mixed” speech cases but dividing them into individual 
communications); see also Paetzold, supra note 74, at 97. 
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disclosure. This public interest has been subverted by the Garcetti 
threshold question, which renders otherwise protected speech a valid 
pretext for retaliatory employment action, thus discouraging 
employees from reporting improper or unlawful conduct. The 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the root of Pickering and its 
progeny was: 
the recognition that public employees are often the members 
of the community who are likely to have informed opinions as 
to the operations of their public employers, operations which 
are of substantial concern to the public. Were they not able to 
speak on these matters, the community would be deprived of 
informed opinions on important public issues. The interest at 
stake is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed 
opinion, as it is the employee’s own right to disseminate it.186 
If this is indeed the case, the Garcetti Court’s willingness to remove 
cases from judicial scrutiny before even reaching the Pickering test is 
perplexing. Furthermore, as examined above, the alternative remedies 
for the employee are so deficient that Garcetti can be a substantial 
barrier to the goal of a well-informed public. 
Proponents of the Garcetti holding argue that it provides essential 
assistance to public employers in maintaining discipline and efficiency 
in the workplace.187 This is undoubtedly the case, but we should be 
concerned with how far we are willing to go to satisfy this end, 
especially when fundamental Constitutional rights are at stake. As 
Justice Souter so eloquently put, “when constitutionally significant 
interests clash, resist the demand for winner-take-all; try to make 
adjustments that serve all of the values at stake.”188 Where the public 
interest in disclosure is great, the employer should not be able to 
defeat protection solely because the employee had a duty to disclose or 
spoke in her role as employee. If the employer can show substantial, 
or in some cases even potential,189 disruption to government 
operations, the employer can still prevail under Pickering. 
Garcetti supporters also posit that a return to the Pickering test 
without any threshold question would lead to a flood of litigation in 
the courts.190 This argument suggests that by implementing a less 
 
 186 San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (citation omitted).  
 187 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422-23. 
 188 Id. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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restrictive test for First Amendment protections, the judiciary would 
open itself to fielding countless frivolous suits on behalf of jilted 
public employees. This argument ignores several important facts. First 
of all, the Pickering test was the controlling law in this arena for almost 
forty years and in that time, the Court saw no need to drastically alter 
the framework in response to any flood of litigation.191 Moreover, as 
noted above, the Pickering test does not necessarily amount to more 
freedom for public employees. It simply assures that the interests of 
the employee-citizen will always be accounted for, even if that 
accounting ultimately weighs in favor of the government. 
Should pure Pickering balancing be deemed overly disruptive to the 
government, Justice Souter’s formulation offers another solution to the 
problem. He argues not for a return to the Pickering test in all cases, 
but a willingness to balance interests where an employee “speaks on a 
matter of unusual importance and satisfies high standards of 
responsibility in the way he does it.”192 This “Pickering test plus” 
approach seems almost tailor made to suit the growing need for 
oversight in the context of law enforcement. When a law enforcement 
officer speaks out on police misconduct or the impropriety of 
department policies, the officer would satisfy the “unusual 
importance” analysis. And, an officer reporting to his superiors would 
satisfy the second prong of the analysis, requiring “high standards of 
responsibility.” No longer would courts be required to deny protection 
to the officer who goes up the chain of command, as his employer 
would surely prefer and may actually require, while protecting the 
employee who blows the whistle publicly. Apart from removing this 
inconsistency, the Pickering-plus approach would give the public a 
chance to get what it so desperately craves: law enforcement willing to 
cross the “Thin Blue Line.” 
At this point, it will be beneficial to look at the practical application 
of the proposed Pickering-plus balancing test. Justice Souter’s 
dissenting opinion never carried the force of law, so there are no 
exemplary cases on point. However, let us endeavor to play the role of 
federal judges and apply the Pickering-plus test to a real factual 
scenario, taken from the Dahlia case discussed earlier. 
The facts of Dahlia are appropriate for this purpose because they 
encapsulate much of what is wrong with both police culture and the 
 
 191 See id. at 435 (“[P]rotection less circumscribed than what I would recognize has 
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judicial systems designed to monitor it. In Dahlia, the plaintiff-officer 
was assigned to work a large robbery case with several other officers 
from his department.193 Almost immediately upon being assigned to 
the case, Dahlia began witnessing incidents of excessive force and 
improper interrogation tactics perpetrated by his fellow officers.194 In 
response, Dahlia went to his immediate supervisor and reported the 
misconduct.195 Dahlia’s supervisor told him to “stop his sniveling” and 
took no action, despite two more complaints made by Dahlia and 
another officer.196 Following these reports, the offending officer, 
Rodriguez, became suspicious of Dahlia and made efforts to cut him 
out of the investigation.197 
That suspicion increased when Dahlia met with his Internal Affairs 
division on several occasions.198 Dahlia began receiving threats and 
harassment from Rodriguez and another officer on an almost daily 
basis, in an effort to ensure that he did not report any misconduct to 
Internal Affairs.199 On one occasion, Dahlia was called to a nearby park 
on the pretext of an emergency situation and arrived to find only 
Rodriguez and another officer present, the two of whom attempted to 
intimidate him into revealing what he said to Internal Affairs.200 
Following this incident, the department received word that the FBI 
might be looking into the robbery investigation and the actions of the 
investigating officers.201 At this, Rodriguez called Dahlia into his 
office, displayed his gun in a menacing fashion and told Dahlia that if 
he continued reporting on the investigation Rodriguez would fabricate 
criminal charges against him.202 Dahlia subsequently reported this 
incident to his local police union and, ultimately, to the Los Angeles 
Sheriff’s Department.203 
As an initial matter, Dahlia provides excellent anecdotal evidence of 
the “Thin Blue Line” phenomenon. Dahlia bore witness to gross 
misconduct on the part of his fellow officers. Instead of being 
applauded for disclosing the truth, he faced harassment and censure 
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from within his own department. What is worse, he had very little 
recourse within the hierarchy of the police department. Dahlia 
suffered an intolerable working environment for months until he was 
ultimately disciplined for doing what he knew to be right. 
As noted above, the Ninth Circuit mentioned several considerations 
that underlie the Garcetti citizen-speech inquiry. The court then 
divided Dahlia’s complaint into the individual incidents of speech — 
per Connick204 — that were alleged: (1) Dahlia’s report to his 
immediate superior, (2) Dahlia’s meetings with Internal Affairs, (3) 
Dahlia’s report to his local union, and (4) Dahlia’s report to the Los 
Angeles Sheriff’s Department.205 Following the dictates of Garcetti and 
its own interpretive precedent, the Ninth Circuit concluded on the 
first point that Dahlia’s report to his supervisor occurred within the 
chain of command and thus did not merit protection under the 
Garcetti framework.206 Regarding the second incident, the Ninth 
Circuit held that Dahlia’s meetings with Internal Affairs might be 
protected speech, although Dahlia may not have disclosed any 
misconduct for fear of reprisals.207 While the Court expressed 
concerns that Dahlia did “precisely what his superiors wanted him to 
do — that is, meet with IA but stay mum,” which the court indicated 
would render his speech unprotected. Yet it also recognized that 
drawing all inferences in Dahlia’s favor, as required on a motion to 
dismiss, Dahlia had stated a claim worthy of First Amendment 
protection.208 Regarding the third incident, the court was again 
concerned with Dahlia’s explicit job duties, but found that at the 
motion to dismiss stage, Dahlia’s disclosure to his union was 
protected.209 Similarly, with respect to the fourth incident, the court 
expressed skepticism about whether Dahlia would be required to 
report to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, but ultimately 
concluded that this incident survived the Motion to Dismiss.210 The 
standard of review is important here. The Dahlia court made clear 
throughout the opinion that Dahlia was entitled to a favorable 
inference at the Motion to Dismiss stage and that it was this inference, 
not any sort of compelling legal case, that allowed Dahlia to prevail.211 
 
 204 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-49 (1983). 
 205 Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1076-78. 
 206 Id. at 1076. 
 207 Id. at 1077. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. at 1077-78. 
 211 Id. at 1076-78. 
  
36 UC Davis Law Review Online [Vol. 52:1 
Again, we should pause and examine the inherent flaws of the 
Garcetti framework as applied to Dahlia’s case. This decision makes 
clear the tendency under Garcetti to focus on the wrong sort of 
inquiries. Instead of emphasizing the balance between employee-
employer rights, informed by public interest, the Dahlia court was 
consumed with inquiries into whether or not Dahlia’s reports were 
made pursuant to his official job duties. Even though three of Dahlia’s 
reporting incidents ultimately survived the Motion to Dismiss, the 
court was clearly skeptical that Dahlia could prevail at trial under the 
Garcetti framework. There is, at the very least, a good possibility that 
none of Dahlia’s communications would merit protection under 
Garcetti. And, if disclosures to a superior, Internal Affairs, a local 
union, and an outside law enforcement agency are not protected, what 
recourse is there for the police officer who witnesses misconduct? Is 
he to suffer the indignity of threats and harassment at his job, 
knowing all the time that he had a chance to stop the corruption? The 
Dahlia court seems to suggest that a report wholly outside the chain of 
command and not directed by supervisors would be protected under 
Garcetti. But again, this raises a question as to the purpose of the test. 
If the concern is the interests of the employer, there is no reason to 
create a test that encourages public whistleblowing as the only route 
to potential protection from retaliation. Certainly, such disclosure 
would serve to inform the public, but it would also create precisely the 
sort of unstable and ill-disciplined government work force that 
Garcetti sought to prevent. Further, under the Pickering balancing test 
a court may find that such outside reporting is sufficiently disruptive 
to justify any adverse action directed at the employee. The officer 
could win the battle but lose the war. 
Now, consider how Dahlia would have been decided under the 
Pickering-plus test. As an initial matter, the Ninth Circuit’s severance 
of Dahlia’s complaint into four separate “communications” or 
“incidents,” squares with Supreme Court precedent under Connick,212 
but it may not be necessary under the Pickering-plus test. For the sake 
of comparison, however, the analysis will preserve the Ninth Circuit’s 
analytical framework. Looking at the first communication, Dahlia’s 
report to his supervisor meets the two requirements for balancing 
under Pickering-plus. First, misconduct by police officers involving 
use of force against civilians is indisputably a matter of “unusual 
importance” to the public, especially in light of the national cry for 
police oversight. Second, Dahlia’s decision to report to his direct 
 
 212 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.138, 147-49 (1983). 
  
2018] Crossing the Thin Blue Line 37 
superior — also the officer in charge of the investigation — complied 
with high standards of professional responsibility. As a result, we can 
proceed to balancing the interests of the employee against the interests 
of the employer. Dahlia clearly has a compelling interest in not being 
complicit in unlawful police practices and also in avoiding the rigors 
of a hostile work environment. At the same time, the police 
department has little to no interest in precluding this sort of 
communication as it does not disrupt the workplace in any form. 
Thus, a court would likely find that First Amendment protection 
applies, and any adverse action taken against the employee in 
retaliation for the speech would be unconstitutional. 
Looking at the other three communications, there is a strong case 
for balancing in each.213 The most interesting of the three, for 
balancing purposes, is Dahlia’s report to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s 
Department. Here, Dahlia’s employer has a case for prevailing on the 
balance because Dahlia’s disclosure to an external agency does 
implicate the department’s ability to properly maintain efficiency and 
compliance. The outcome will likely depend on how the outside 
investigation was initiated, how Dahlia came to testify, and whether 
the employer can show actual or potential disruption in the 
department as a result. These facts are not revealed by the 
complaint.214 At the very least, this demonstrates that balancing under 
Pickering does not automatically amount to a victory for the 
employee.215 
The outcome under Pickering-plus squares more properly with the 
interests that we have considered thus far and removes some of the 
inconsistencies inherent in the Garcetti framework. For example, the 
outcome under Pickering-plus removes the incentive for the employee 
to report outside the chain of command.216 There is no way to be 
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certain, of course, that the employee’s report will be treated seriously 
or result in a policy change but, at the very least, the employee will 
have a remedy if subjected to adverse employment action. And if 
disclosures to several internal organizations — Internal Affairs and the 
police union in the Dahlia example — are not sufficient to address a 
problem, then the corruption at issue is probably so systemic and 
structural that employee speech may be simply insufficient as a 
remedy.217 But at least the test offers protection from retaliation for 
public employees who do the right thing. 
Moreover, the Dahlia example makes clear the Pickering-plus test’s 
capability to represent all relevant interests in the case. The public’s 
interest is vitiated at the initial stage — by way of appeal to matters of 
“unusual importance” — and again at the Pickering balancing test. The 
employer’s interest is also represented at the initial stage — via the 
high standards of professional responsibility requirement — and again 
at the Pickering balancing stage. And, of course, the employee’s 
interest is validated in the balancing test itself. This recognition and 
respect for the interests of all involved parties is preferable to the 
Garcetti framework’s preclusion of balancing based on the arbitrary 
and false citizen/employee speech dichotomy. 
Applying regular Pickering balancing to the facts of Dahlia leads to 
the same result. There is no requirement that the speech be on a 
matter of “unusual importance” to the public or that it be raised in a 
highly professional manner. The speech need only be on a matter of 
public concern. That determination is made based on the context of 
the speech. Abuse of suspects and witnesses by police officers reported 
to superiors, the Internal Affairs Department, and ultimately to an 
outside investigating agency certainly meets that test. Then balancing 
occurs, with the employee’s speech interests balanced against the 
employer’s interests in managing the workforce. The factors in the 
balance will be the same under either test. While this test does not 
contain the preliminary requirements that take into account the 
interests of the employer and the public, the public concern 
requirement, present in both tests does provide a check that insures 
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that the subject of the speech indeed concerns the public interest and 
is not merely a private dispute between the employer and employee.218 
A return to Pickering balancing, with or without the enhancements 
suggested by Justice Souter, will not solve the problems of police 
shootings of unarmed citizens, abuse of suspects and witnesses, or 
departmental corruption. It will, however, remove one barrier for 
officers who want to do the right thing and truthfully report identified 
problems in policing. While retaliation may occur, the officers will 
have a more potent remedy, which may encourage some to come 
forward. An altered legal test would not have saved Laquan McDonald. 
But perhaps the truth about Laquan McDonald’s shooting would have 
surfaced earlier. Perhaps there would have been fewer necessary 
indictments of officers. Perhaps officers will think twice about 
engaging in unlawful conduct if the gaps in remedies for truth-telling 
are replaced by gaps in the thin blue line. 
CONCLUSION 
Since its inception, the Garcetti test for First Amendment 
protections in public employment has proven problematic. The test is 
difficult to apply, removes incentives for public employees to disclose 
government misconduct, and robs the public of internal government 
oversight. Recent developments in the field of state and federal law 
enforcement have rendered these drawbacks particularly damning. 
The growing demand for oversight in the realm of law enforcement 
necessitates a retreat from Garcetti. Instead, the Court should adopt 
either the standard Pickering balancing test or the Pickering-plus 
approach advocated by Justice Souter in his Garcetti dissent. Both tests 
allow a court to consider all the relevant interests implicated by a 
public employee’s First Amendment claim: the interest of the 
employee, the interest of the employer, and the interest in maintaining 
transparent government and a safe and informed public. Moreover, 
these approaches offer a simple balancing test that courts can 
understand and apply, rather than the arbitrary and false dichotomy 
created by Garcetti. Most importantly in this time of civil unrest, 
Pickering balancing presents an opportunity to cross the “Thin Blue 
Line.” 
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